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Love, artificiality and mass identification 
 
ABSTRACT: How are we to understand the phenomenon of mass identification, 
epitomized in recent exhibitions of national feeling such as that of South Africa’s 2010 
Football World Cup celebrations? Rather than focussing on the concepts of discourse and 
nationalism, or advancing an analysis of empirical data, this paper outlines a conceptual 
response to the challenge at hand, drawing on the tools of psychoanalytic theory. Three 
explanatory perspectives come to the fore. Firstly, such exhibitions of mass emotion might 
be understood as demonstrations of love, as examples of the libidinal ties that constitute 
and consolidate mass identification. Secondly, the marked artificiality of such displays of 
emotion and the fact of the ‘externality’ they entail might be seen, paradoxically, to be 
essential rather than inauthentic or secondary features of the displays in question. Thirdly, 
we might advance, via Lacan, that many of our most powerful emotions require not only 
recourse to the field of the inter-subjective, but reference also to the anonymous, ‘fictional’ 
framework of available symbolic forms. 
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Love, artificiality and mass identification 
 
Identity-extension 
This paper makes a psychoanalytic contribution to the growing literature on 
collective emotion (Sullivan, 2014; von Scheve & Salmela, 2014), and does so 
via a series of Freudian and Lacanian concepts. Let us imagine then, by way of 
introduction, a football supporter glued to the screen, watching the dying 
minutes of a crucial game. Suddenly, a member of his team steals the ball and 
slots home the winning goal. In the ensuing moment of elation, the supporter 
feels that the goal is in some ways his also; he feels that “we” scored, “we” 
won, etc. For a few seconds there is a giddy sense of unity, of an expanded, 
indeed, a joint “we”. 
 This example helps to bring to life the central question of this paper, 
namely, how might we account for this over-extension of identity, this 
apparent short-circuit between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’? How does one come to 
experience oneself as part of a given group whose membership is always 
somehow contingent? The sense of belonging enabled in such apparent 
displays seems able to involve and enthuse even those who typically 
experience little by way of group or national sentiment. How is it that 
celebrations and events of this sort are able to affect such identity extensions 
such that the ego is – however briefly – powerfully invested in the order of the 
collective? Two further issues will prove crucial. The first concerns love, or, as 
is more befitting of psychoanalytic conceptualization, the fact of a libidinal tie 
underlying a mass identification. The second concerns the factor of externality, 
what we might refer to as the ‘detour through others’ that qualifies many of 
our most powerful affective experiences. This brings to mind the (not 
infrequent) paradox whereby many people can confidently claim that a 
sporting victory - an event in which they had no integral role to play - was one 
of the greatest moments in their lives. As one South African fan put it in her 
account of what the 2010 World Cup meant to her: “[I]t was the best moment 
ever. Best. It's a part of my life which I'll never forget” (The Guardian, 2010).  
The consideration of exteriority will also prompt discussion of the symbolic 
paraphernalia – pageantry, flags, songs, team colours and insignia - that so 
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frequently accompany and support the expression of collective emotion in 
such contexts. This in turn poses questions concerning the apparent necessity 
of a degree of artificiality as – paradoxically – a precondition of the 
‘authenticity’ of emotion. 
The power of the pageant 
Although my concerns in this paper are primary theoretical, it nonetheless 
proves useful to begin with two descriptive passages focussing on the 
experience of the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in South Africa. These descriptions 
prove invaluable not only in grounding the discussion that follows, but in 
illustrating many of the key theoretical postulates I go on to advance. Before 
turning to Freud and Lacan then, let us listen to the thoughts of two journalists 
who covered the event: 
Arriving in South Africa in the middle of 2010 felt…like walking into 
fantasyland. The World Cup competition…had taken over the 
country…there was an exuberant feeling of having beaten the 
odds…[of having] surpassed expectations…I was not prepared for the 
sensation of national levitation that swept me up… Everywhere I 
went, longtime friends, even curmudgeonly types who had predicted 
disaster…struck unexpected patriotic poses. They wore the colours 
of the national team, flew South African flags from their car 
antennas, crowded into buses to get to games in the middle of the 
day, and reported a sense of cross-racial unity, and pride, in the 
nation’s achievement. Several said that it seemed like the arrival of 
another miracle, just like [the end of apartheid] in 1994...[It] marked 
a welcome counterweight to an anti-immigrant furore that had 
swept through Johannesburg and Cape Town in 2008…It was 
something like a sports version of [former President] Thabo Mbeki’s 
African Renaissance (Foster, 2012, pp. 458-61). 
Sixteen years after experiencing the unforgettable rush of belonging 
and relief at Nelson Mandela's inauguration in 1994, I felt it again 
last month…watching the South African national team play their last 
World Cup game…although the victory was insufficient to qualify us 
into the next round, the consensus across the country following the 
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game was that "we won!" Why? First, because [the national team]  
Bafana Bafana (Zulu term of endearment meaning "the boys") 
played at last with optimism, unity…as good a recipe as any for a 
nascent national identity. Second, because we proved to a skeptical 
world – and thus ourselves – that we could host a World Cup… But 
"we won" most of all, because we could finally say "we"… something 
shifted during the World Cup: with a team to support and half a 
million guests to take care of, we found ourselves all on the same 
side… South Africans were waving flags, and supporting their team 
out of a sense of joy and belonging, rather than the deficit-driven 
pride that has fuelled both Afrikaner and African nationalism for so 
long (Gevisser, 2010b). 
Gevisser adds a further detail that is particularly worth stressing, in which his 
own behaviour, as influenced by the affects and actions of those around him, 
takes him by surprise: 
At the beginning of the match, I had found myself – to my 
astonishment – singing the South African national anthem. In the 
spirit of the reconciliatory Mandela era, the anthem is an amalgam 
of the liberation hymn, Nkosi Sikelel 'iAfrika and the apartheid-era 
Die Stem. I have not been able to bring myself to sing the latter, but 
as I watched the Afrikaners around me trying to twist their mouths 
around Nkosi Sikelel and black South Africans in turn belting out Die 
Stem with unfettered delight, my stand seemed ridiculously churlish 
(Gevisser, 2010b). 
These evocative accounts contain several themes that will feature in what 
follows: the experience of being swept up in a contagious mass emotion that 
potentially supersedes one’s own feelings; the formation of transitory 
collective ‘we’ able to span existing social divisions; the narcissistic high of 
securing the approving gaze of the Other; and the key role of visual markers 
and insignia of identity (flags, colours of the national team) along with that of 
the  performance of ritualised symbolic acts. 
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The love of the mass 
In thinking of World Cup enthusiasms and passions such as those described 
above, it is tempting to say that it is exactly a kind of love that we are 
observing. In the language of psychoanalysis we speak of love in terms of an 
attachment, as a libidinal tie. It is worthwhile referring to Freud here, so as to 
ground from the outset what may otherwise seem an anomalous term (i.e. 
‘libido’). Libido, notes Freud (2004), is how we are to understand the energy of 
the drives that is in operation relative to love. At basis we are concerned with 
sexual love, however, as Freud (2004) qualifies, we are interested with 
whatever shares the name of love, from “self-love…parental and infant love, 
friendship, general love of humanity, and even dedication to concrete 
objects…[and] abstract ideals” (p. 41). Freud goes on to assert the hypothesis 
that love relations – that is, libidinal ties – also form the basis of the mass 
mind. This somewhat tentative suggestion eventually gives way to a bolder 
proclamation, when Freud maintains that the essence of the mass “consists in 
the libidinal attachments present within it” (2004, p. 53).  
Freud’s mass psychology proves a useful starting-point for our 
discussion. For a start, it involves a series of questions on the nature of 
identification, and, indeed, posits two inter-linked modalities of identification, 
both of which will be crucial in maintaining the ‘libidinal economy of the mass’. 
Rather than rehearse the details of Freud’s (1921) text on mass psychology, an 
exercise that has been undertaken many times before (see Adorno, 1991; 
Ahmed, 2004; Billig, 1976), I want to extract a few central points, and overlay 
them with a series of Lacanian perspectives.  
The (symbolic) place of love 
Freud (1921) begins his analysis of mass psychology with a discussion of Gustav 
Le Bon’s study of crowd behaviour. There is much there which appeals to him, 
notably the postulate that crowd membership leads to a lowering of intellect, 
to the contagious spread of irrational ideas, to a range of features 
approximating those of the unconscious mind. However, this conceptualization 
is for Freud ultimately lacking; it fails to understand the bonding component of 
the mass, to grasp the positive motivation underlying such groupings, to 
appreciate exactly the facet of shared identification. This is Freud’s cue. He 
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wishes to contribute this missing psychological component, and to do so by 
pinpointing the bonding passion that centres a mass and proves able to over-
ride the tensions and differences within the group.  
It is the role of the leader, muses Freud (1921), that Le Bon’s account 
lacks, and it is precisely this, the question of the relation to – or love of – the 
leader that he wants to develop. It is this libidinal focus, which Freud will 
repeatedly associate with love of the father, which will provide the much 
needed component of group cohesion, shared interest, or, more accurately 
yet, of, mass identification. Without wasting further ink on a feature of Freud’s 
account that has been much criticized, namely the ostensibly reductive and 
patriarchal emphasis on the paternal, we might add a crucial qualification here. 
Within Lacanian theory ‘father’ typically designates the role of a symbolic 
operator (Lacan, 2013), never reducible to actual (human) fathers, through 
which the intercession of social law and cultural norms are conveyed into the 
life of the subject. It is in this way, as a symbolic function, that we will read the 
father-leader equation that appears so frequently within Freud’s discussion.  
In this respect the leader could in fact be said to be ‘more father than 
father’, certainly inasmuch as they represent a focal-point through which 
cultural norms, symbolic ideals and social proscriptions are condensed and 
relayed. This reference to social laws and ideals provides a clue regards how 
we will respond to a further charge that may be put to Freud (Billig, 1976): 
surely not all groups have evident leaders; and the role of the leader – even if 
not of an obvious sort – is surely not a precondition of collective belonging? 
This, of course, is precisely my argument: by focussing on the symbolic place 
rather than the figure of the leader we can still utilize elements of Freud’s 
account in respect of a variety of ostensibly ‘leader-less’ mass identifications. 
Freud concedes relatively early on his mass psychology that there is “[t]he 
possibility of the leader being replaced by a guiding idea” (2004, pp. 46-47). 
 We should not of course be too quick in altogether ejecting the role of 
leaders/father in phenomena of mass identification. Here it is worth remarking 
how frequently the name of Nelson Mandela – the father and moral leader of 
South Africa is ever there was one – was evoked in relation to South Africa’s 
hosting of the FIFA event. One of the first images that greeted international 
visitors to the country at Johannesburg’s airport was that of the former 
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president posing alongside the World Cup trophy. The link between symbolic 
ideals embodied in South Africa’s hosting of the event and the figure of 
Mandela himself, is nicely evoked by a respondent to an article in The 
Guardian (2010) entitled ‘The Rainbow Nation’s Verdict’: “You cannot just say 
it’s the football that makes people proud…we have Mandela”.  We might put it 
this way: when a set of social and symbolic ideals are powerfully animated, 
then a leader is never far away. We have a nice instance here of a Lacanian 
addition to Freudian theory: it is not simply the case that charismatic leaders 
embody social and symbolic ideals; a surge of such ideals also calls out for, in 
some cases even engenders, charismatic leaders.  
From love to identification 
It is worth pausing over a further conceptual clarification here, so as to 
consider whether the love in question is not a more nuanced category than we 
may have at first assumed. That is to say, we need think of this love as a 
libidinal tie. Such a tie exhibits a variety of vicissitudes, not the least of which 
concerns the oscillations of ambivalence (loving and hating) and, in addition, 
the movement between the positions of wanting to have and wanting to be 
like. Also important here is that the love in question may be a love we don’t 
know we have, a love that is disavowed. The relation in question may, 
furthermore, be accommodated precisely via attributions made of the affective 
ties of others.  This would be love at a distance, love enabled via the loving 
relations of others, which serve to channel my own in an ostensibly external 
manner. This poses an interesting line of enquiry in respect of the 
phenomenon of being swept up in the contagion of group affect: the 
enthusiasm and excitement of others is enough to implicate and activate my 
own, which may seem – like Foster’s (2012) curmudgeonly friends, or 
Gevisser’s (2010b) singing of the South African national anthem – to spring into 
life despite one’s own contrary views. 
One should note furthermore that this love is, in a significant sense, 
premised on an impossibility. The difference signalled above between wanting 
to have and wanting to be like comes into play here. The leader, or, the 
symbolic place the leader comes to occupy, does not represent a viable object 
of love. They cannot, in any concrete or literal sense, be possessed as a love 
partner. This love, this wanting to have – a variation in Freud’s thinking of 
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Oedipal dynamics – is, as such, inevitably thwarted. Given that such a libidinal 
tie cannot be effectively realized as a romantic relationship it must take a 
different form. This mode of love – which will also become the basis of a 
formative symbolic identification – is not just a failed romantic love. It is love 
taken to a higher level, a love of – and a sense of belonging to – a series of 
abstract ideals.  
Why though should the romantic love for the leader (the wish to have 
them as one’s own love object) necessarily fail? Well, it is of course perfectly 
imaginable that in some instances it doesn’t – popular leaders are no doubt 
the target of many erotic urges. Perhaps the point to be made here is that this 
bond typically undergoes a transformation, and that Freud is interested in 
differentiating this mechanism - that of identification – from the loving relation 
of ‘being in love with’. A crucial distinguishing factor here is loss. The 
impossibility of possessing the leader, which is ensured by obvious empirical 
limits, means that this loved figure has to be surrendered. A compromise 
follows: aspects of the lost loved object can be retained, reinstated in the ego, 
with “the ego undergoing a partial change, modelling itself on this lost object” 
(Freud, 2004, p. 67). The ego is thus able to possess the leader symbolically, by 
“becoming” them, through a primary identification which installs them within 
the ego, a process Freud understands as ‘regressive identification’. Such a 
procedure enables the internalization of an ego-ideal. We have a template 
then for the libidinal constitution of the mass: “[a] primary mass is the number 
of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego-
ideal and who have consequently identified themselves with one another in 
terms of their egos” (Freud, 2004, p. 69).  
Divisions of loss 
It is easy enough in the above discussion, to remain focussed on the role of 
shared ideals. However, the factor of loss ensures that the bond in question is 
more complex than it first appears. We could say that symbolic identification 
always entails a death, the painful giving up of a loved or hoped for object. It is 
then not the mere mutuality of shared positive values that bonds a group; a 
profound sense of likeness is also fostered by the fact of shared sacrifice, by 
the consideration of what members in a given community have each had to 
forego. This is of course one of the lessons of Freud’s (1912) Totem and Taboo 
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concerning the killing of the primal father, namely, that a traumatic event 
precedes the formation of the social bond and the ideals associated with it. At 
first glance, this fits our example of the mass identifications enabled by South 
Africa’s World Cup, the celebratory mood of which needs to be located as a 
post-apartheid phenomenon, as following precisely after the historical trauma 
of apartheid. Now while it is true that legitimately shared losses of that period 
may well inform the symbolic ideals of post-apartheid communities, it is also 
true that not all South Africans are equally positioned with regard to what was 
lost in, or by virtue of, apartheid.  Neither, crucially, are they equally 
positioned in respect of relations of guilt for what happened in the apartheid 
era. As such, unlike what Freud postulates in Totem and Taboo, such historical 
trauma holds the potential not so much for a guilt-based affective solidarity, 
but for divergent affective relationships to the past. This means that despite 
the euphoric sentiments of cross-racial unity described above, we should be 
wary of assuming that shared symbolic ideals, and shared bonds of loss, do 
actually bond South Africans. 
A further hypothesis is worth advancing here. Pride, it seems, is the 
affect realized in the attainment of given ego-ideals; it is the emotion we 
experience as we approach the ego-ideals we have come to cherish in relation 
to a loss. If this is so, then pride is always more than a simply positive emotion 
– it is an affect that occurs on the horizon of an earlier loss, in response to 
something that we were unable to possess. This poses the intriguing question 
of whether South Africans feel national pride in significantly different ways, of 
whether – as seems probably the case – divergent values and senses of loss 
inform what such groups are most proud of in their national identities. This is 
not to say that the possibility for a flurry of exuberant national feeling is 
foreclosed. It is though, in a properly psychoanalytic way, to ask what loss 
underlies the celebration of given ego-ideals, and to question whether what 
really bonds diverse mass groups (such as that of the South African nation) is 
not a paradoxical solidarity of forgetting. What comes into view then is the 
possibility of an alliance of repressed losses which, paradoxically, comes to the 
fore precisely in shared moments of jubilant national togetherness. More 
simply put: in exulting in such national sporting pageants, we do not all exult at 
the same thing, even though in exulting we do share a certain commonality, 
namely the very fact of repressing (very different) senses of loss. As Hook 
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(2013) puts it in respect of sentiments of unity in the South African context: “In 
moments where we experience a sense of genuine communality…in which we 
share a joint cause, what we share perhaps most of all is a ‘solidarity of 
repression’” (p. 122). 
The political function of love 
As the cherished and respected social ideals which mean more than the ego 
itself, a subject’s ego-ideals are the values for which they – at least in theory - 
would be willing to live and die for. Importantly however, the ideals 
themselves need not be ‘ideal’, by which I mean to stress that objectionable 
values may be elevated to such a position, as is in the case of the anti-Semitic 
ideals underlying Fascist ideology. Here it is worth noting that South Africa’s 
enthusiasm to embrace nationalistic pride during the World Cup was viewed 
by suspicion by some. As Hook (2013) intimates, such jubilant displays of 
patriotism may be linked to more exclusionary – indeed, xenophobic – values.  
Such a connection is also alluded to in Foster’s (2012) above descriptive of 
World Cup revelry as a ‘counterweight’ to the anti-immigrant attacks in the 
country in 2008.  It is likewise made evident in the comments offered by 
Walter Ranyemba, a Zimbabwe migrant working in South Africa at the time of 
the World Cup, who lamented: “people are promising that as soon as the 
World Cup is finished they are going to beat and burn alive all foreigners…it’s 
an embarrassment, it's a shame to South Africa. The unity will be meaningless” 
(The Guardian, 2010). 
It is perhaps worth noting here that ego-ideals are as much a question of 
values and ideas as of powerful affective investments; ideology and affect 
would thus seem to be inextricably intertwined in ego-ideals. One might argue 
in this respect that Freud has provided us with an answer to the nature of the 
bonds that tie us to particular social institutions and symbolic ideals. His mass 
psychology can in this sense be read as a treatise on the political function of 
love. 
i(o) & I(O): Imaginary and Symbolic identification 
As we have seen, Freud’s theory of mass identification entails two different 
lines of attachment. Group members are “bound in two directions by an 
intense emotional tie” (2004, p. 74), by attachments both to the leader and to 
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fellow group members who can be identified with and, indeed, loved, by virtue 
of a set of shared ideals. Intragroup tensions, although never completely 
eliminated, are thus significantly minimized: “through bestowing equal love 
upon the same object…[potential rivals] come to identify with one another” 
(Freud, 2004, p. 74).  In the words of a South African fan quoted by The 
Guardian (2010): “[A]ll South Africans were united… there were no barriers of 
colours, black, white, we were South Africans”. The point is similarly made in 
Gevisser’s (2010b) report: 
[W]hat was most remarkable was the way South Africans talked to 
each other, not only at the matches…but in the daily life that went 
on around the tournament. An elderly white neighbour almost wept 
as she told of her conversations with the supermarket staff and 
petrol pump attendants: "We were talking to each other like normal 
people," she told me. 
Taking up from Freud (2004) we might say then that brotherly (or communal) 
feeling only really becomes possible via the mediation of symbolic ideals. It is 
through the figure of the leader, or extrapolating somewhat, through any 
related display or performance that animates the ego-ideal values in question, 
that we transcend the anarchic state of every subject against every other 
subject, and experience an elementary sense of community. This point is made 
repeatedly in accounts of the World Cup: South Africa’s hosting of the event 
engendered a rare sense of cross-racial communality, a sense of an 
encompassing national ‘we’ not commonly experienced in the country.  
The two types of libidinal bond described by Freud (2004) are effectively 
illustrated in one of the chief examples he employs, namely that of the 
‘artificial mass’ of the military. There is, in the military, the figurehead of the 
general – themselves, importantly, an intermediary of higher values – beneath 
whom there are multiple lower ranks. The soldier, to paraphrase Freud, thus 
takes the superior figure of the general as their ideal, whereas they identify 
with their peers and thereby derive the obligations and benefits of 
comradeship. If we were to try and plot the vectors of Freud’s mass 
identification we could think of symbolic (ego-ideal) identifications as of a 
vertical sort, as necessarily entailing a hierarchical dimension, as a relationship 
with values and ideals of a higher level than that of the ego itself. By contrast, 
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‘shared cause’ (ideal-ego) identifications would be of a horizontal sort, 
between ‘like others’, who represent my own possible mirror image.  
The distinction between these two modes of identification can be 
further developed along Lacanian lines. On the one hand we have an imaginary 
type of identification (i(o) in Lacanian algebra) which unfolds along the lines of 
likable images that maintain a self-valorizing, affirming quality (Lacan, 2000b). 
These are the grandiose or idealized, indeed, narcissistically-gratifying, images 
of ourselves – or our group - that we hold dear, our preferred self-images. This 
imaginary dimension prioritizes visuality. It comprises the field of mirror-
images, through which the inter-subjective dialectic of seeing one’s self in 
others is facilitated. This theoretical point is perfectly illustrated by the World 
Cup behaviours mentioned above: fans dressing in the jerseys or colours of the 
national team, flying flags from their cars, painting their faces, etc. From the 
perspective of Lacanian theory, this is not merely decorative or cosmetic 
behaviour, it is quite literally a case of ‘identity within the visual field’, an 
instance of how such visual insignia provide a basis for the ongoing process of 
imaginary identification. 
We may contrast the domain of imaginary identification with the 
‘structural’ or historical dimension of symbolic identifications (I(O) in Lacanian 
algebra). This is the regime of identification which corresponds to one’s 
symbolic co-ordinates, to the historical location, societal ideals and ideological 
values that importantly delimit and condition the imaginary field of imaginary 
identifications. So, whereas the imaginary register emphasizes the dimension 
of visuality and resemblance, the symbolic dimension prioritizes history, along 
with a set of associated socio-symbolic roles, inter-subjective positions and 
mandates. Perhaps the clearest instance of a signifier of symbolic identification 
within the above descriptions of the World Cup is that of the South African 
National Anthem. Gevisser’s (2010b) initial unwillingness to sing the anthem 
points to exactly the questionable historical and ideological values he sees 
epitomised in Die Stem, the Afrikaans segment of the song, which had been a 
powerful symbolic instantiation of Afrikaner Nationalism in the apartheid era. 
 
Imaginary built on Symbolic 
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Although imaginary identification typically feels primary, it must in fact be 
considered secondary relative to the socio-historical and ideological co-
ordinates of symbolic identification. This may seem counter-intuitive. After all, 
it is imaginary ego identifications, that is, the stuff of mirror-image, ‘like-other’ 
reflections - what we may think of as the psychological facet of identification - 
that we experience as more immediately relevant. 
Žižek (1989) helps justify this prioritization in his distinction between 
identification with the image in which we would appear likeable to ourselves, 
and identification with the place from which we are being observed.  This is the 
difference between how we see ourselves reflected in others, and how we are 
placed relative to society’s most cherished values. Put differently again – 
staying with Žižek (1989) - every imaginary identification is an identification on 
behalf of a certain gaze before which one might be said to be enacting a role. 
The gaze here connotes the place of symbolic ideals, the ‘radius of the leader’ 
even if no – or various – instantiations of such a leader are clearly present.  For 
each example of an identification we may then ask: what is the loveable image 
that it attempts to mimic; and, for whose benefit is this image is being 
enacted? This factor of symbolic identification – the place of symbolic ideals, 
the gaze from which one is assessed – is abundantly clear in how South Africa’s 
World Cup achievements are qualified. Time and time again reference is made, 
either implicitly or explicitly to ‘the world’, which clearly acts here as a locus of 
idea values, the Other to whom the image is offered: “we proved to a skeptical 
world – and thus ourselves – that we could host a World Cup” (Gevisser, 
2010b), “They said we wouldn’t be able to host the World Cup but we did. We 
proved to them we could do it” (The Guardian, 2010). 
By the time an imaginary identification is in place, a more substantive 
symbolic identification is always already in operation. This is a logical necessity: 
unless there was some delimitation and prioritization of what particular 
imaginary features are most loveable, how would I even know what images to 
love? What delimits the particular features that I find loveable in my own (ideal 
ego) image - “I’m a pretty girl”, “I’m a big strong boy” – already rely on a 
particular set of values, in this case that of patriarchal norms of femininity and 
masculinity. In the absence of such symbolic coordinates, no imaginary identity 
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is possible; should the symbolic coordinates be erased, the contingent 
imaginary identification will likewise disappear.  
The case of shame at a given identification proves instructive here. The 
mixed-race South African political commentator Eusebius McKaiser (2012) 
recently provided a poignant account of his shame at his ‘coloured’ (mixed-
race) identity which he views as closely aligned with social problems of poverty 
and drug-abuse. Initially, this seems difficult to understand within the Freudian 
theorization of the loving libidinal ties that bond a mass. While the lateral, 
intra-communal ties bonding group members yield a variety of affects, most 
notably the ambivalences of aggression and narcissistic love, shame doesn’t 
easily manifest at this level. However, when one imagines oneself as viewed 
from an external position of symbolic ideals that are one step-removed from 
the internal identifications within the community itself, shame becomes 
operative. It should be clear then, in returning to the South African World Cup 
example, that the narcissistic enjoyment of hosting this event – which itself 
exemplifies the imaginary jubilation of an ideal mirror image being reflected 
back at one (Lacan, 2000b) – was ultimately contingent on the affirming gaze 
of an Other - the observing world – located beyond the level of the South 
African community itself. 
Affective (non)commitment 
Given the foregoing discussion of ego-ideal values, we might ask: surely we are 
dealing with something more substantial and significant than the instances of 
spectatorship and national feeling that I cited at the beginning of this paper?  
Such feelings and their related activities are, after all, relatively transient; they 
seem insubstantial, even cosmetic, relative to the depths of affective belonging 
outlined in Freud’s model. It pays here to stress a Lacanian approach that 
grasps the unconscious not in ‘depth’ but rather in surface phenomena. This, 
after all, is a model concerned with an external rather than an internal 
unconscious (Lacan, 2006c). A Lacanian perspective consequently points to the 
importance of the socio-symbolic frame and underlines the factor of 
artificiality as a basis, or platform, for certain types of affect.  
In other words, we are making the claim, perhaps unusual for 
psychoanalysis, that some of our most powerful emotions require not only a 
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degree of exteriority to be effectively realized – recourse to others, the field of 
the inter-subjective – but also reference to  the anonymous ‘fictional’ 
framework of available symbolic forms. There are at least two component 
strands to this line of argument. The first stresses the role of others as 
intermediaries in the effective expression of a given affect. The second entails 
the notion that without symbolic activity, that is, the mediation of popular 
cultural forms and fictions, certain affects would not be effectively realized as 
such. 
 Apropos certain detached forms of ideological belief, Žižek (1989) notes 
that many of our most intimate beliefs, “even the most intimate emotions… 
crying, sorrow, laughter, can be transferred, delegated to others” (p. 34) 
without losing their sincerity. For Žižek, the idea of a degree of detachment is 
important, both for ideological belief and for much powerful affect. He draws 
on Lacan (1992), who provides a series of historical examples in which intimate 
feelings are transferred onto others. Professional mourners (‘weepers’) who 
are paid to attend and express despair at funerals of those they didn’t know, 
makes for a case in point, as does the chorus in Greek tragedy who effectively 
feel for, emote on behalf of, an audience who is thus permitted a degree of 
detachment from the dramatic proceedings. It would however be a 
misunderstanding of Žižek’s (1989) Lacanian point to conclude that the subject 
who delegates their feelings or belief in this way is not fully experiencing such 
affects. They most certainly are feeling/believing, all the more effectively so, 
one might argue, but via the medium of the other. This casts an interesting 
light on participation in mass sporting events, on the interest many have in 
attending such public spectacles where there is bound to be an abundance of 
others who can, in a sense, feel not just with, but for, indeed, on behalf of one. 
Žižek’s (1989) extended argument - which neatly demonstrates how the 
unconscious may operate in external, social forms – is that, via the medium of 
others, we may effectively believe without consciously knowing we do so. We 
have thus a case of believing – and of course of feeling - by extension, in the 
guise of the other. By the same token - and here the phenomena of cynical 
detachment is for Žižek (1989) the most striking contemporary example - we 
may believe, in, say, nationalism, even racism, without any (apparent) 
participation via the mediation of others who do actively participate in such 
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beliefs. The upshot of this idea of a type of remote feeling/believing is striking. 
We may effectively feel something without consciously knowing or subjectively 
endorsing it, indeed, without fully realizing the affective state that conditions 
our current experience. We may, for instance, already be in love with 
someone, without having yet realized it. Likewise, although we might, in a 
posture of cynical detachment, deny it, our relationship to our country might 
be characterized by a passionate attachment of which we are not fully aware. 
This idea of a type of latent love, of loving without knowing it, is thus a useful 
way of approaching forms of nationalist affect (the ‘love of the nation’) (Dolar, 
1993) that often exist in seemingly ‘de-activated’ or tacit forms.  
Such cases of what we might call ‘affective (non)commitment’ typically 
involve a type of passivity and the presence of someone or something else who 
objectifies the belief/affect in question. Žižek (1989) dubs this phenomena 
‘inter-passivity’, and cites the example of canned laughter on TV, which 
relieves the audience of the duty to laugh.  Not only may someone else believe 
or feel for me – the unconscious here being in effect another person – their 
state of belief or affect can be a condition of possibility for me to extend a 
latent belief or affect into an actually realized form. We might return here to 
Gevisser’s (2010b) anecdote about being astonished to find himself singing the 
South African National Anthem. This example speaks to the idea of the affects 
of others acting as a scaffold of sorts – a means of support or facilitation – for 
one’s own affective expressions. One might expect in such situations that one’s 
own passions might be, as it were, ‘more real’ as expressed in others, just as it 
might be the case where the affective expressions of others supersede my 
own. 
What this discussion makes clear then is that affects are continually 
subject to the two-way dynamics of inter-subjective identification. This means 
both that my affects are continually subject to a form of transference (in)to 
others (i.e. the ‘outbound’ delegation of affective states), and that many of my 
powerful affects are only assumed through the mirror of the other, that is, by 
witnessing them in others and thus feeling through them (an ‘inbound’ re-
assumption of affect). Hence the reason for the continual Lacanian emphasis 
on the topic of the ‘big Other’, the notion, in other words, that a modicum of 
externality, or otherness, indeed, of the socio-symbolic lies at the very heart of 
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the subjective. Hence also Lacan’s (1992) notion of ‘extimacy’, the idea that 
which is most intimate and revealing of a subject may only be identified or 
experienced in an ostensibly external form. 
Through the medium of the Other 
From a Lacanian perspective then, affects are never merely subjective, or 
located ‘in’ individual subjects. A Lacanian orientation emphasizes instead the 
extra-subjective dimension, the irreducible inter-subjectivity of affect. Why 
though, we might ask, should the Other be so crucial in the life of affect? A 
reflection on psychotherapeutic practice may be in order here. The medium of 
what is displaced, ‘not me’, may provide a viable vehicle of exploration for 
what may not otherwise be accessed on the ‘intra-subjective’ plane. It enables 
the subject to strike some distance from intensities, ‘reals’ of experience; 
furthermore, it affords an expressive possibility, it makes the articulation of 
(particularly powerful) affects possible in a more bearable way.  
The paradox is clear enough: I often need the external dimension of an 
Other to ‘get in touch’ with losses or joys that would not otherwise remain 
adequately articulated. What is so crucial here, certainly in instances of 
extreme affectivity, is the opening up of a gap between the ‘real’ of engulfing 
experience and the minimal objectivity of seeing one’s own affective state (of 
loss, trauma, ecstatic experience) transplanted into the situation of another. 
Perhaps this accounts for the therapeutic effect of art or popular cultural 
narratives (be it in the form of film, television or fiction) where, time and time 
again, an audience is able to feel – via characters in a drama – the elation of 
victory or the desolation of despair, in a way that is both one step removed 
and also remarkably vivid and of immediate personal resonance, despite that is 
clearly fictional in basis.  
It pays here to draw attention to two adjoined meanings of the ‘Other’ 
in Lacanian jargon, that is, to the ‘Other’ as both otherness, alterity, that which 
is external to the subject, and ‘Other’ as ‘treasury of the signifier’ (Lacan, 
2006c), that is, as the encapsulation of the symbolic order as such. In both such 
senses the Other enables some or other expressive possibility and thus 
alleviation in relation to the ‘real’ of affect. We may consider, particularly in 
respect of the latter of these two dimensions of the Other, how linking 
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unbearable affects to a symbolic frame possesses a delimiting, ‘containing’ 
potential. No doubt part of what is so difficult, so puzzling about intensely 
‘alone’ emotions (feelings of loss, bereavement, depression, etc.) is that they 
lack a broader symbolic frame which supports various possibilities of 
articulation, and enables types of inter-subjectivity through which affects may 
be effectively shared, communicated, ‘given shape’, adequately expressed, 
and, eventually, processed. Hence the importance of funeral rites, and the 
often elaborate series of customs and mourning rituals and ceremonies, so 
often sidelined in contemporary Western secular society, in many cultures 
(Leader, 2003). 
We might claim the same about intense personal affects of joy, 
celebration, jubilation. They too might often be said to lack an obvious social 
expressive modality; they might also benefit from some or other formal 
procedure, some explicit form of commemoration. We return here to the 
sports fan who feels that accomplishment of his team represents the greatest 
day of his life. We should take this claim seriously, although we might care to 
phrase it somewhat differently: the team’s victory represents the best 
expressive modality, the best societal, trans-subjective form whereby such 
personal affects – subjective instances of joy or triumph – may be linked to a 
broader symbolic frame, and thus made real in a social context. 
ConclusionTwo last points should be made before closing. The first runs 
against the grain of cynical dismissals of the superficiality of public affects such 
as those generated by mega-sporting events, commemorative jubilees and the 
like. Such events provide a potent expressive vehicle for neglected ‘intra-
subjective’ modes of affectivity; they set up a prospective short-circuit 
between past (and hitherto ‘under-expressed’) affective experiences and a 
properly trans-subjective cathartic opportunity. (One should note of course 
that this does not mean that we know exactly what it is in our personal 
histories we are celebrating, rejoicing or commiserating when we are swept up 
in the euphoria or disappointment of such World Cup adventures.) In such 
instances we have not just an overlap of the artificial and authentic, but also 
that of shared social experience - the trans-subjective – and the ‘intra-
subjective’ which, for a short time become entangled, inextricable. 
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The second point concerns an apparent inconsistency in the argument I 
have presented above. I have suggested that displays in the Other, i.e. 
‘shareable’ socio-symbolic demonstrations of affect, might be a necessary 
precondition if certain subjective affects are to be realized at all. Yet I have also 
suggested that such Other displays (the expressive modality supplied by trans-
subjective events) may simply allow the social articulation of what was already 
latently present in the individual subject. We need here make room for the 
factor of retroaction. Put differently, we might say that the category of affect 
becomes here somewhat virtual; it seems to be both, in certain instances, 
‘non-existent’ prior to its realization through the Other, and yet also latent, 
already silently there, yet made accessible only after a type of retroactive 
activation. So, it is not the case that we know from the outset, that we are 
passionate South African football supporters (or, indeed, proud South African 
subjects). It is rather that through a series of symbolic activities and proxy 
involvements – many of which maintain a superficial quality, dictated by norms 
of sports spectatorship, the imagery of advertisers, etc. – that we create the 
preconditions for types of affect that had hitherto remained latent, and that 
we then go on to experience - often with surprising enthusiasm and vigor – as 
natural, spontaneous.  
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